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NOTE AND COMMENT 
 
RESTRICTING THE “MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS”:  THIRD 
PARTIES, MEDIA CANDIDATES, AND FORBES’ IMPRECISE 
STANDARDS 
If a man does not keep pace with his companions, 
perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. 
 
— Henry David Thoreau, from Walden 
 
That’s right, kids.  We can beat those guys. 
 
— Jesse Ventura, Minnesota Governor and former 
Reform Party member, nine days 
before he was elected1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
History illustrates the impact of third parties2 on the development of new 
policies and the testing of new programs, such as the Prohibition Party’s 
support of women suffrage and the Socialist Party’s struggle against child 
labor.3  Reform can only begin outside status quo standards of acceptability. 
In June 1992, Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) 
invited the Republican and Democratic candidates for Arkansas’ Third 
Congressional District to participate in a televised debate scheduled for 
 
 1. ABC World News Sunday (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 25, 1998). 
 2. For the purposes of this Note, “third party” will be used interchangeably with “minor 
party” and “independent candidate” to describe candidates who are not members of mainstream 
political parties. 
 3. Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).  Another notable third 
party was the Populist Party, which campaigned for equal rights for men and women.  J. DAVID 
GILLESPIE, POLITICS AT THE PERIPHERY: THIRD PARTIES IN TWO-PARTY AMERICA 25 (1993). 
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October.4  Two months later, after obtaining the 2,000 signatures required by 
Arkansas law, Ralph Forbes was certified as an independent candidate 
qualified to appear on the ballot.5  The executive director of the agency denied 
Forbes’ request to be included, explaining that “viewers would be best served 
by limiting the debate” to only the two invited candidates.6  The one-hour 
debate allowed approximately fifty-three minutes for the candidates to speak.7 
Forbes filed suit, and after remand,8 the District Court entered judgment 
for AETC.9  The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating AETC’s 
assessment of Forbes’ “political viability” was neither a “compelling nor [a] 
narrowly tailored” reason for excluding him from the debate.10  The Supreme 
Court again reversed, holding that AETC’s decision to exclude Forbes from 
the debate was consistent with the First Amendment.11 
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s opinion in Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission v. Forbes.  Part II briefly provides background on the 
role of third parties, the public forum doctrine, and the requirement that 
administrative agencies formulate clear standards.  Part III summarizes Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Forbes and Justice Stevens’ dissent.  Part IV 
criticizes the majority’s acceptance of the vague, indefinite standards used both 
in the language of the public forum doctrine and in AETC’s explanation for 
Forbes’ exclusion.  Finally, Part V proposes an original solution in light of 
previously suggested alternatives – legislation containing a two-step analysis 
of candidate exclusion combined with a multiple-debate format. 
II. HISTORY/BACKGROUND 
A. Third Parties’ Rights 
Citizens who evaluate major-party candidates solely on issues are twenty 
to twenty-eight percent more likely to support third parties.12  Third parties 
 
 4. Arkansas Educational Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 671. 
 7. Id. at 670. 
 8. For a summary of Forbes’ procedural history prior to remand, see Thomas F. Ackley, 
Political Candidates’ First Amendment Rights Can Be Trumped By Journalists’ Editorial Rights: 
Candidates Barred From Public Television Debate in Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 31 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 475, 505 (1998). 
 9. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672. 
 10. Id. at 672.  The Court of Appeals’ decision is discussed in greater detail by ACKLEY, 
supra note 8, at 505-509. 
 11. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 683. 
 12. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA: CITIZEN RESPONSES TO 
MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 164 (2d ed. 1996). 
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popularize ideas that the major parties ignore and serve as policy innovators.13  
As such, provide a voice for a large number of the electorate and “should not 
be viewed . . . as outside the [political] mainstream.”14 
Courts have often used strong language to support third parties.15  In 
Anderson v. Celebrezze,16 an independent candidate’s supporters gathered 
signatures, filed documents, and submitted filing fees in order to meet the 
requirements of ballot access.17  An early filing deadline, applicable only to 
independent candidates, however, prevented the candidate’s name from 
appearing on the ballot.18  The Supreme Court held the early deadline 
unconstitutional: 
a state’s claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise 
decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with 
some skepticism, and it is often true that the best means to that end is to open 
the channels of communication rather than to close them.19 
The Court also stated that restrictions on small political parties or on 
independent candidates “threaten to reduce diversity and competition in the 
marketplace of ideas.”20 
A similar restriction on the “marketplace” was held unconstitutional in 
Williams v. Rhodes.21  Election laws required new political parties to obtain 
petitions signed by qualified electors totaling fifteen percent of the number of 
 
 13. Id. at 221-22. 
 14. Id. at 223. 
 15. See Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (“A desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular 
cause [is] plainly illegitimate”) and Fulani v. League of Women Voters, 882 F.2d 621, 627 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (“[Campaigns] are used to educate the public, to advance popular ideas, and to protest 
the political order, even if the candidate has no hope of election.”). 
 16. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).  Justice Stevens argued in favor of a 
minor-party candidate in the majority opinion of Anderson as he does in the dissent in Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666.  See infra pp. 11-12. 
 17. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 798 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). 
 20. Id. at 794.  For further discussion on filing deadlines, see Fred H. Perkins, Better Late 
than Never: The John Anderson Cases and the Constitutionality of Filing Deadlines, 11 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 691 (1983).  Although the concept of a “marketplace of ideas” dates back to John Milton 
in the 18th century, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained the concept in his dissent in 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919): 
  [W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come 
to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas – that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market. . . .  That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
Id. 
 21. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
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ballots cast in the previous election.22  An independent candidate met the 
threshold, but was still denied ballot access due to an early filing deadline.23  
The Court stated that “all political ideas cannot and should not be channeled 
into the programs of our two major parties,” and warned that the “absence of 
[minority and dissident] voices would be a symptom of grave illness in our 
society.”24 
B. The Public Forum Doctrine and Candidate Exclusion 
While third party views are to be respected, public property is not open for 
unrestrained free speech.25  Governmental bodies will often regulate how 
public events can proceed and may also require applications or permits before 
a group can have access to a public space.26  The Supreme Court has 
established the public forum doctrine to determine when a government’s 
interest in limiting the use of its property outweighs the interest of those who 
wish to use it for free speech purposes.  Three types of fora exist, each with its 
own criteria for exclusion.27 
A traditional public forum is characterized by the objective characteristics 
of the property, such as whether by tradition, the property has been devoted to 
assembly and debate.28  Exclusion must be necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and must be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.29  For 
example, the Court stated in Hague v. CIO30 that streets and parks “have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.”  Streets and parks thus fall into the 
traditional forum category. 
 
 22. Id. at 24-25. 
 23. Id. at 26-27. 
 24. Id. at 39 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)); see also Keith 
Darren Eisner, Non-Major Party Candidates and Televised Presidential Debates: The Merits of 
Legislative Inclusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 990-997 (1993).  Eisner discusses ballot access 
laws and other barriers third parties face, such as the electoral college’s winner-take-all format in 
presidential elections.  Kevin Cofsky argues in favor of strict scrutiny for ballot access laws in 
Panning the Political Thicket: The Case for Strict Scrutiny of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 
145 U. PA. L. REV. 353 (1996).  A state-by-state listing of the number of signatures that were 
required by a new party in order to appear on the November 1996 ballot can be found in John F. 
Persinos, Third Party Rising?,  CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Sept. 1995. 
 25. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 
(1981). 
 26. Private citizens, however, still have a greater right than government to regulate speech 
on their property.  Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1972). 
 27. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 28. Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org. (CIO), 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
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The second category of fora is the limited, or designated, public forum.  
The government specifically opens the property for expressive activity by all 
or part of the public and also intends to make the property “generally 
available” to a class of speakers.31  Speakers need not obtain permission to use 
the property to assert their views.32  Limited purposes include use only by 
certain groups, such as student groups,33 or for the discussion of certain 
subjects, such as school board business.  In a limited public forum, government 
is free to impose a blanket exclusion on certain types of speech, but once it 
allows expressive activity of a certain genre, it may not selectively deny access 
for other activities of that genre.34  Any exclusion from a limited public forum 
is subject to strict scrutiny.35 
The nonpublic forum is the third category.  Courts have not articulated a 
specific definition of nonpublic fora, but if public property is not a traditional 
or limited forum, it is either a nonpublic forum or not a forum at all.36  As 
stated by the Court, “[the] State, no less than a private owner of property, has 
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated.”37  In other words, the government is not required to open 
property for expressive activity if the property has traditionally served a 
different purpose.  Any exclusion must be reasonable and not an effort to 
suppress expression based on the speaker’s views.38 
C. The Public Forum Doctrine Generally Does Not Apply to Public 
Broadcasting 
Broadcasters have a duty to schedule programming that serves the public 
interest and convenience,39 which requires them to exercise substantial 
editorial discretion in the selection of their programming.40  A large amount of 
speakers must therefore be excluded.  The public forum doctrine usually does 
not apply to public broadcasting because the many claims that would arise by 
excluded speakers would require courts to tediously oversee which individuals 
or groups have had an opportunity to speak.41 
 
 31. Int’l. Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992). 
 32. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804. 
 33. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 34. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (stating 
that once a limited forum has been opened, its lawful boundaries must be respected); Travis v. 
Owego-Apalachin School Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 35. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990). 
 36. Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678-79. 
 37. Id. at 679-80. 
 38. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
 39. 47 U.S.C.S. § 309(a) (1998). 
 40. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674. 
 41. Id. 
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Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee42 
tested these principles.  A national organization of businessmen who wished to 
express their views on Vietnam filed a complaint with the Committee, 
charging that a radio station had refused to sell them time to broadcast a series 
of one-minute announcements.43  While acknowledging that balancing First 
Amendment interests involved in the broadcast media and determining what 
best serves the public’s right to be informed is a “task of great delicacy and 
difficulty,” the Supreme Court held that broadcast licensees had broad 
journalistic discretion in the area of discussion of public issues and the public 
interest would not be served by a system affording a right of access to 
broadcasting facilities for paid editorial ads.44 
The Court stated that great weight must be afforded to the decisions of 
Congress and the experience of the FCC.45  Congress has consistently rejected 
efforts to impose on broadcasters a “common carrier” right of access for all 
persons wishing to speak out on public issues.46  An absolute right of access 
would implicate the FCC in a case-by-case determination of who should be 
heard and when, thus enlarging the involvement of the government in 
broadcasting operations.47  Substantial risks also accompany a policy of broad 
access – the system may be monopolized by those who could pay the costs, 
and public accountability, which now rests with the broadcaster, would be 
diluted.48 
The Court thus held that the public has a right to adequate coverage of a 
range of viewpoints, but not every individual member of the public has a right 
to broadcast his own particular views on any issue,49 as could be the case under 
the public forum doctrine.  Providing time for all viewpoints is not only 
physically impossible, but also antithetical to the purpose of broadcasting; 
editorial discretion becomes a necessity. 
D. Agencies Must Promulgate Definite Standards 
Administrative agencies are accountable for exercising their discretion, 
however.  The existence of an “absolute and uncontrolled discretion” in a 
 
 42. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
 43. Id. at 98. 
 44. Id. at 123-25. 
 45. Id. at 102. 
 46. Id. at 106-09.  “Common carrier” or “carrier” means any person engaged as a common 
carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign 
radio transmission of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to 
this Act; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is engaged, 
be deemed a common carrier.  47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (1998). 
 47. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 126-127. 
 48. Id. at 124-25. 
 49. Id. at 127. 
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governmental agency vested with the administration of a vast program would 
be an “untolerable invitation to abuse.”50  Due process requires that selections 
among applicants be made in accordance with “ascertainable standards,”51 and 
in cases where many candidates are equally qualified under these standards, 
further selections must be made in some reasonable manner.52 
In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,53 an Alabama ordinance stated 
that anyone who wished to participate in a parade or public demonstration 
must first obtain a permit.54  The ordinance also authorized the members of a 
city commission to refuse to issue a permit if required to do so in order to 
preserve “public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals, or 
convenience.”55  Defendant and fifty others were arrested for marching four 
blocks in protest of the denial of civil rights to African-Americans in 
Birmingham, Alabama.56 
The Court held that without “narrow, objective, and definite standards” to 
guide the licensing authority, the ordinance must be held unconstitutional.  
Licensing systems cannot vest in an administrative official “discretion to grant 
or withhold a permit upon broad criteria unrelated to proper regulation of 
public places.”57 
Similarly, in Soglin v. Kaufman,58 college students protesting the presence 
of recruiting representatives from an environmental corporation were 
suspended for misconduct by the Administrative Division of the Committee on 
Student Conduct and Appeals.59  The Supreme Court held that rules 
embodying standards of discipline must be contained in “properly promulgated 
regulations” and “reasonably clear and narrow rules.”60 
 
 50. Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2nd Cir. 1968); see also 
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964) (stating that “the public has a right to expect 
its officers to observe prescribed standards”). 
 51. Hornsby, 326 F.2d at 612. 
 52. Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964), (petition for reh’g denied). 
 53. Shuttlesworth City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
 54. Id. at 149. 
 55. Id. at 149-50. 
 56. Id. at 148-49. 
 57. Id. at 150-51, 153; see also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951); Saia v. New 
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S 268 (1951). 
 58. Soglin v. Kaufman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 59. Id. at 165. 
 60. Id. at 167. 
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III. ARKANSAS EDUC. TELEVISION COMM’N V. FORBES 
A. Summary of the Majority Opinion 
Forbes explores the relationship among third party rights, the public forum 
doctrine, agency discretion, and agency accountability.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Kennedy’s opinion addressed three primary issues: 1) 
whether the AETC debate was a forum, 2) if so, which of the three fora was 
applicable, and 3) whether AETC’s decision to exclude Forbes was consistent 
with the First Amendment. 
Kennedy first states that the public forum doctrine, having first arisen in 
the context of streets and parks, should not be extended to public 
broadcasting.61  Any event aired by public broadcast, in other words, should 
not be considered a forum, and the public forum doctrine does not apply.  The 
doctrine commands open access and viewpoint neutrality.62  Broad rights of 
access to speakers by stations, however, would conflict with the editorial 
discretion stations must exercise in order to fulfill their journalistic purpose.63  
Kennedy states that if the judiciary established a criteria for access, “it would 
risk implicating the courts in judgments that should be left to the exercise of 
journalistic discretion.”64 
Through an awkward exception, however, Kennedy states that candidate 
debates are a forum citing two reasons.65  First, unlike other broadcasts, the 
debate was “by design a forum for political speech,” so any views expressed 
by the speakers were not the opinions of the station, and broadcasters cannot 
exclude a candidate from participating because of his views.66  According to 
Kennedy, even though unlimited access is not possible, debates meet the 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality.67  Second, “candidate debates are of 
exceptional significance in the electoral process,” a process by which the 
majority of Americans make their voting decisions.68 
 
 61. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672.  This assertion is consistent with Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), supra pp. 6-7 and n.42. 
 62. Id. at 673. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 674 (relying on Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 
94 (1973), supra pp. 6-7 and n.42). 
 65. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 675-76.  See also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (stating that “it is of 
particular importance that candidates have the . . . opportunity to make their views known so that 
the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on 
vital public issues before choosing among them on election day”). 
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Having decided that candidate debates are a forum, Kennedy then labeled 
the AETC debate as a nonpublic forum.69  His analysis focused on the 
distinction between limited public fora and nonpublic fora.70  Because AETC 
first reserved eligibility for participation in the debate only to candidates for 
the Third Congressional District seat, and then made candidate-by-candidate 
determinations as to which of the eligible candidates would participate, 
Kennedy concludes the debate was a selectively-accessed nonpublic forum.71  
He then criticized the Court of Appeals’ holding as a “misapplication of 
precedent” that would result in “less speech, not more.”72  According to 
Kennedy, if all ballot-qualified candidates are required access, then 
broadcasters, facing the choice of chaos of First Amendment liability, may 
choose to not air any debates.73 
The third and final portion of the majority opinion assessed whether 
Forbes’ exclusion was based on his views, and thus a violation of his First 
Amendment rights.74  Any exclusion must be reasonable.75  Susan Howarth, 
the executive director of AETC, testified that Forbes was excluded for four 
reasons: 1) neither Arkansas voters, nor the news media, considered him a 
serious candidate, 2) the Associated Press and a national election result 
reporting service did not plan to run his name in results on election night, 3) 
Forbes had little, if any, financial support, and 4) the only campaign 
headquarters were at the candidate’s house.76  Howarth concluded that Forbes 
was not “newsworthy” enough to be invited to the debate.77 
Kennedy states that “[i]t is, in short, beyond dispute that Forbes was 
excluded not because of his viewpoint, but because he had generated no 
appreciable public interest.”78 
B. Summary of Stevens’ dissent 
Justice Stevens criticizes AETC for an “ad-hoc decision” which “does not 
adhere to well-settled constitutional principles.”79  He cites specific facts that 
appear to undermine AETC’s credibility.  Just two years before the exclusion, 
Forbes had received 46.88% of the statewide vote and had carried fifteen of the 
 
 69. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680. 
 70. Id. at 678-80.  Both parties agreed that the debate was not a traditional public forum.  Id. 
at 679. 
 71. Id. at 680. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Forbes at 681. 
 74. Id. at 682. 
 75. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Brief for Petitioner at 3; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 666. 
 78. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682. 
 79. Id. at 684. 
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sixteen counties within the Third Congressional District by absolute 
majorities.80  In two of the other three districts in which both major party 
candidates had been invited to debate, one of them had virtually no chance of 
winning, and raised even less money than Forbes.81  Furthermore, the winner 
of the election only received 50.22% of the vote, so the decision to exclude 
Forbes, who could have taken votes away from either side, may have 
determined the outcome of the election.82 
Stevens thus states that AETC staff had nearly limitless discretion to 
exclude Forbes, and the majority’s opinion is based on broad, subjective, and 
indefinite standards.83  There were no written criteria to guide AETC’s 
decision to exclude, and certain factors could favor inclusion as well as 
exclusion.  Forbes’ lack of financial support, for example, may be reason for 
allowing him to share a free forum with wealthier candidates.84 
Stevens also explains the constitutional importance of the distinction 
between state ownership and private ownership of broadcast facilities.85  Public 
ownership creates unacceptable risks of governmental censorship and use of 
media for propaganda, and the First Amendment prohibits the vesting of broad 
unbridled discretion in a governmental official.86  Furthermore, a privately-
owned network would be subject to scrutiny under the Federal Election 
Campaign Act unless the network used “pre-established objective criteria to 
determine which candidates may participate in [the] debate.”87 
Regarding the public forum doctrine, Stevens states that televised debates 
may not fit such an analysis, and the First Amendment will not tolerate 
arbitrary definitions of the scope of the forum.88  Under the Court’s reasoning, 
however, it created a designated public forum if the AETC invited either the 
entire class of “viable” or “newsworthy” candidates.89  Stevens ends by again 
emphasizing that pre-established, objective criteria should govern access to 
political debates managed by state-owned entities.90 
 
 80. Id. at 684-85. 
 81. Id. at 686 n.6.  Democrat Ray Thornton, the incumbent, defeated Republican Dennis 
Scott by winning 74.2% of the vote.  Scott also raised only $6,000 (the amount Forbes raised was 
not stated).  Id. 
 82. Id. at 685. 
 83. Id. at 686. 
 84. Id. at 692. 
 85. As Stevens notes, the majority gives very little treatment to the distinction between 
private and state-owned broadcast facilities.  Id. at 684. 
 86. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 688. 
 87. Id. at 685. 
 88. Id. at 692, 690. 
 89. Id. at 694 n.18.  The terms “politically viable” and “newsworthy” are indistinguishable.  
Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 1144 (8th Cir. 1996) (Beam, J., dissenting). 
 90. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 694-95 (relying on Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 
147 (1969)). 
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE MAJORITY OPINION 
A. Application of Vague Standards 
Kennedy claims that the public forum doctrine usually does not apply to 
public broadcasters because they will be subject to a number of claims of 
viewpoint discrimination.91  But such claims are directly attributable to the 
vague standards of the doctrine.  The doctrine thus should not apply, but for 
different reasons.  As seen in Forbes, words such as “compelling state 
interest,” “reasonable,” and “viewpoint discrimination” are open to simple 
manipulation, which then subjects the marketplace of ideas to confinement.92 
Kennedy’s two reasons for applying the doctrine are as indefinite as the 
doctrine itself.  First, he claims there will be “minimal intrusion” by the 
broadcaster on speakers’ views during the debate.93  But such a standard 
ignores the critical initial step of candidate exclusion.  Lack of intrusion during 
the debate does not help candidates who have been denied access.  Second, 
Kennedy cites the importance of candidate debates in the electoral process as a 
justification for the application of the public forum doctrine.94  The importance 
of the debate, however, provides ample reason to not apply the ad-hoc 
exclusion standards of the doctrine.  Flexible standards can easily exclude 
meaningful candidates.  The debate demands fair and objective exclusion 
criteria in order to minimize the risk of unfair speech suppression. 
Howarth’s conclusion about Forbes’ “newsworthiness” was held to be both 
reasonable and not based on the candidate’s political views, and therefore 
passed the nonpublic forum exclusion requirements.95  A determination of a 
speaker’s “newsworthiness” without specific criteria, however, is an 
impermissible content-based standard.  Professor Barbara Mack of Iowa State 
University provides a definition of “newsworthiness”: 
When I teach freshmen journalists about what is meant by newsworthiness, 
what makes someone newsworthy, you talk about the quality that person or 
that news event has.  Is that news event going to have an impact on the people 
who read your newspaper or who watch your television station?  Is it going to 
change their lives?  Does it have the potential to change their lives?  Is it 
 
 91. Id. at 674. 
 92. Frederick Schauer expresses a similar view in Principles, Institutions and the First 
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998).  Schauer believes that applying the unclear public 
forum doctrine probably is not appropriate in this case.  First Amendment law distrusts 
particularity, however, and broad rules are considered necessary for a strong First Amendment.  
Id. at 111. 
 93. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675. 
 94. Id. at 676, noting that debates are regarded as the only occasion during a campaign when 
the attention of a large portion of the American public is focused on the election. 
 95. Id. at 682. 
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something which is a public conflict?  Conflict is one of our classic news 
values.  Impact is a classic news value.96 
A judgment of a candidate’s “quality” can only be subjective.  Focus on 
“conflict,” “impact,” and “news values” de-emphasizes issues, and voter 
knowledge in favor of the status-quo.  But the high level of disinterest toward 
politics among many Americans indicates the need to reform the status-quo.  
Despite an estimated increase in voter registration to an estimated 128 million, 
and record amounts of money spent in the 1996 election, voter turnout in 1996 
was only an estimated 48.8% of eligible voters, the lowest turnout since 1924 
and the second lowest since 1824.97  Since 1980, when the modern presidential 
debates began, voter turnout as a percentage of eligible Americans who voted 
each year since 1960 shows a declining trend in all years except 1992, when 
Reform Party candidate Ross Perot challenged the major parties and was 
included in the presidential debates.98  A reason for voter apathy is the lack of 
alternative candidates to choose from.99 
Two examples from the 1988 and 1992 presidential campaigns illustrate 
the negative effect of a “newsworthy” standard on voter education.  During a 
campaign speech, Vice President George Bush incorrectly referred to 
September 7 as the anniversary of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.100  
Bush’s misstatement received six paragraphs of coverage in both The New 
York Times and the Washington Post and eight paragraphs in the Los Angeles 
Times.101  Policy issues rarely receive such a high level of attention.  Similarly, 
during the 1992 campaign, Governor Bill Clinton’s first major statement on the 
economy occurred the same day that Senator Bob Kerrey, running against 
Clinton, whispered a sexual joke during a political roast.102  A microphone 
 
 96. Professor Mack provided the definition of “newsworthiness” during her testimony as an 
expert witness for Iowa Public Television in Marcus v. Iowa Public Television, 97 F.3d 1137, 
1143 (1996). 
 97. Nearly 68% of eligible voters were registered in 1996, the highest percentage since 1968.  
Nearly half of the eligible voters won’t go to the polls, experts say, available at Nando.net, 
http://www.nando.net/nt/Elex96/11.1.96/1101eligible.html. 
 98. The 1992 debates boosted support for Perot.  He stood at 13% in the polls before the 
debates, but had risen to 19% after the third debate.  During the first debate, in fact, the dial 
groups for both President George Bush and Governor Bill Clinton recorded more positive ratings 
when Perot spoke than had ever been seen before.  The general consensus was that Perot had won 
the debate, followed by Clinton, then Bush.  NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 211, 232 
(9th ed. 1996).  One of the dangers of excluding candidates is the deligitimization they suffer.  
Eisner, supra note 24.  After exclusion, the public will likely assume that third party candidates 
are not capable of effective performances. 
 99. POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 98, at 274. 
 100. THOMAS E. PATTERSON, OUT OF ORDER 152 (1994). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 148. 
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leaning toward Kerrey picked up the joke and it became the major story of the 
day.103  Clinton’s speech received minimal coverage while The Washington 
Post devoted four stories and an editorial to Kerrey’s joke.104  Both incidents 
likely fit Professor Mack’s criteria for newsworthiness because of their 
“impact” and “conflict,” but at the same time, coverage of such events reduces 
politics to a caricature devoid of substance. 
Programs and policies have become less “newsworthy” than tabloid 
sensationalism.  A public “politically socialized” or conditioned to seek 
entertainment loses interest in issue explanation.105  “Policy issues, on the other 
hand do not ‘happen;’ they merely exist [and] generally remain static.”106  As 
consultant William Zimmerman states: “TV demeans the news . . . by 
presenting only cursory glances at substantive world events while reserving 
hours for in-depth coverage of the weather.  Is it any wonder that negative ads 
work in such an environment?”107 
By excluding Forbes based on his lack of “newsworthiness,” AETC 
implicitly claims the debate will be more “newsworthy” without his 
participation.  The logic of the opinion, which supports AETC’s decision, thus 
rests on the dangerous assumption that minor party voices only distract from 
mainstream views, rather than significantly contribute to political dialogue.  
For an issue to change citizens’ voting habits, it must reach a high degree of 
salience for the voter.108  The Socialist Party was known for its support of 
women suffrage and twenty years before the Civil War, the Liberty Party 
struggled against slavery.109  These third parties ultimately fought to raise 
issues to a higher level of voter saliency, the first step to change.110 
Specifically, collective change begins with voters who only pay a moderate 
amount of attention to politics.111  Those who are most attentive likely identify 
themselves with a party and will overwhelmingly support that party’s 
position.112  Voters who pay little or no attention to politics on the other hand, 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  Clinton’s speech received coverage in one story on the fourth page of the 
Washington Post.  Id. 
 105. “Political socialization” is the process by which an individual receives societally 
approved attitudes toward politics.  KEVEN V. MULCAHY & RICHARDS S. KATZ, AMERICA 
VOTES: WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ELECTIONS TODAY 92 (1976). 
 106. BARBARA G. SALMORE & STEPHEN A. SALMORE, CANDIDATES, PARTIES, AND 
CAMPAIGNS: ELECTORAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 149 (2d ed. 1989). 
 107. Id. at 161. 
 108. POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 98, at 20. 
 109. GILLESPIE, supra note 3, at 24, 27. 
 110. Female suffrage later became part of both the Democratic and Republican party 
platforms in 1916, and the 19th Amendment granting women the right to vote was passed in 
1920.  Id. at 27. 
 111. POLSBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 98, at 21. 
 112. Id. 
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also cannot be persuaded because of their refusal to think about or analyze 
issues.113  The moderate voter is thus open to persuasion, but most citizens are 
not well informed about the details of issues.114  Not surprisingly, voters tend 
to have more years of formal education than non-voters; an understanding of 
issues and policy makes politics “less threatening and more interesting.”115 
Debates educate.  Third parties thus become valuable additions, the 
teachers who are not guided by pressure from constituents or the need to 
engage in strategic wordplay.  Minor parties can “tell it like it is,” thereby 
bringing more citizens into the political arena by increasing their awareness 
and grasp of issues.116  By reaching out to the moderate voter through 
information, a change in public consciousness can eventually occur. 
Allowing a “newsworthiness” standard to meet the requirement of neutral 
exclusion as required by the public forum doctrine also guarantees the 
exclusion of most third party candidates.  Media access, which leads to 
“newsworthiness,” will often be difficult because, unlike Republicans or 
Democrats, minor parties do not enjoy the benefits of large donations117 or 
historical success. 
Guided by vague standards, Forbes could signal a significant erosion of 
Anderson’s support for third parties.  The need for more objective standards in 
order to protect the “marketplace of ideas” has never been more important. 
B. Even if the Public Forum Doctrine Applies, the Debate was a Limited 
Public Forum 
Limited public fora are designed only for use by certain groups.118  
AETC’s invitation to ballot-qualified candidates for Arkansas’ Third 
Congressional District only meets the requirement of a limited group, of which 
Forbes was a member. 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 87 (4th ed. 1997).  
See also, MULCAHY & KATZ, supra note 105, at 23 (stating that “[t]he interested person is more 
likely to vote”). 
 116. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not 
Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 
SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1998). 
 117. Money dominates major party politics today because it is considered necessary to win 
elections.  See Meg Greenfield, The First Qualification, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1999, at 74 (stating 
that “It’s no longer whether candidates are fit to hold office.  It’s their ability to raise money.”); 
Jonathan Alter & Michael Isikoff, The Real Scandal is What’s Legal, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1996, 
at 4-5 (listing the largest soft money donors to Democrats and Republicans); Michael Duffy and 
Viveca Novak, The New Money Game, TIME, Nov. 2, 1998; David Van Biema, What Money Can 
Buy, TIME, June 20, 1994. 
 118. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
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AETC “already decided to give over its airwaves to political contenders for 
[elected] office”119 by inviting the two candidates.  One “genre” was therefore 
included, and AETC was not free to deny access to activities in the same 
“genre.”120  The indefinite standards of the doctrine again become apparent.  
The Court disregards the limited public forum requirement of equal access for 
all members of a certain class once the government grants access to one 
member.  If Forbes, a member of a limited class of speakers, is denied access, 
then how is one to determine the difference between a limited public forum 
and a nonpublic forum?  Nonpublic fora are defined awkwardly as “not limited 
fora,”121 but in Forbes, the Court claims a limited fora is nonpublic.  This 
redefinition of the public forum doctrine will only lead to greater confusion. 
AETC also urged the Court to treat the debate not as a public forum, but as 
a form of editorial reporting, which would enable them to “edit” candidates.122  
Journalism, however, only observes and reports on those issues it feels are 
most important.  A debate, on the other hand, is based on political dialogue – 
the exchange of ideas, arguments, questions, and answers.  Although the Court 
does not comment on AETC’S argument, the comparison is a flawed one that 
does not realistically assess the nature of candidate debates. 
V. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
A. Legislation Modeled After the Federal Election Campaign Act 
Privately-owned broadcasters must follow guidelines set forth in 11 C.F.R. 
110.13, which requires written, objective criteria for candidate exclusion.123  
The commentary to the section states: 
 
 119. Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecomm. Comm’n, 917 F.2d 486, 493 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(Clark, J., dissenting). 
 120. Travis v. Owego-Apalachin School Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 121. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 678-679. 
 122. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 77, at 23. 
 123. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 685.  As Justice Stevens notes in his dissent, Federal Election 
Commission Regulations, 11 C.F.R. 110.13, Candidate Debates provides: 
 (b) Debate Structure.  The structure of debates staged in accordance with this section and 11 
C.F.R. 114.4(f) is left to the discretion of the staging organization(s), provided that: 
  (1)    Such debates include at least two candidates: and 
  (2)   The staging organization(s) does not structure the debates to promote or advance 
one candidate over another. 
 (c) Criteria for Candidate Selection.  For all debates, staging organization(s) must use pre-
established objective criteria to determine which candidates may participate in a debate.  For 
general election debates, staging organization(s) shall not use nomination by a particular political 
party as the sole objective criterion to determine whether to include a candidate in debate.  For 
debates held prior to a primary election, caucus or convention, staging organizations may restrict 
candidate participation to candidates seeking the nomination of one party, and need not stage a 
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those staging debates would be well advised to reduce their objective criteria to 
writing and to make the criteria available to all candidates before the debate.  
This will enable staging organizations to show how they decided which 
candidates to invite to the debate.124 
After Forbes, Congress should require public broadcasters to adhere to the 
same specifications. 
The legislation should specifically, state, however, that “reasonable” or 
“newsworthiness” will not pass as objective criteria.  Previous suggestions for 
such criteria include tighter restrictions on ballot access laws, with all ballot-
qualified candidates allowed access to debates, and access for any candidate 
who qualifies for matching funds.125 
Following Anderson’s theory of respect for third party views, candidates 
should not be excluded if: 1) they have shown sufficient public support 
through either the stated previous suggestions, petition signatures, previous 
election history, evidence of national organization, or findings of significant 
public opinion polls, and 2) the candidate’s participation will enhance the 
voters’ understanding of the issues. 
The first requirement incorporates “newsworthiness” with fairness.  Rather 
than focusing on relatively insignificant factors such as the location of a 
candidate’s headquarters, as AETC did with Forbes, broadcasters would now 
consider the public’s support for a candidate’s stand on the issues.  The second 
requirement, although stated broadly, eliminates any fringe candidate such as a 
celebrity, who passes the first prong of the test, but is concerned with publicity 
rather than policy.126  Additionally, its basis lies in the important notion that 
 
debate for candidates seeking the nomination of any other political party or independent 
candidates. 
 124. Federal Election Commission, 60 Fed. Reg. 64, 261 (1995). 
 125. The related topic of fusion, the nomination of the same candidate by the major party and 
a third party may be necessary for third party survival, according to James Gray Pope, Fusion, 
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, and the Future of Third Parties in the United States, 50 
RUTGERS L. REV. 473 (1998).  For proposed legislation that would require candidates to receive 
free airtime, see Jeffrey A. Levinson, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Provide 
Free Airtime to Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U.L. REV. 143 (1992). 
 126. Jesse “The Body” Ventura, a celebrity and former professional wrestler, stood at 23% in 
the polls in Minnesota’s gubernatorial race two days before the election.  The major party 
candidates, Democrat Hubert Humphrey III and Republican Norm Coleman were not far ahead at 
36% and 33% respectively.  Ventura, running for the Reform Party, would have easily passed the 
first requirement of public support.  As for the second requirement, commentators noted 
Ventura’s “knowledge” and “intellect” concerning the issues despite his unorthodox television 
ads and general demeanor.  He thus would pass both elements and be allowed to participate in 
debates, as was the case.  According to commentators, the debates “significantly increased his 
legitimacy.”  CNN Late Edition (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 1, 1998). 
  Ventura was elected on November 3, 1998, proving that third parties can have an impact 
even when not expected to.  Ventura also revived citizens’ interest, many who would have “sat 
out the election if he hadn’t run.”  CBS This Morning (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1998). 
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even a candidate who is not likely to win serves a legitimate purpose within the 
electoral scheme. 
Similar to the Federal Election Act, broadcasters should reduce all 
decisions to writing and provide copies for the candidates.  Both prongs should 
be explained in order to facilitate efficient campaigns in the future. 
B. Multiple Debates 
An objection to the proposed legislation will likely be that too many 
candidates will be allowed access.  Consistent with Anderson, restricting the 
marketplace of ideas because of too many ideas is illogical.  Expanding the 
time to express those ideas, however, increases political debate and voter 
knowledge.  Unlike saturated media coverage, televised debates provide the 
unusual experience of candidates explaining issues directly to voters.  A public 
weary of politics often settles for campaign rallies and media sound-bytes as 
sufficient information.  However, respect not only for the candidate, but for the 
constituents the candidate will affect through his elected position, justifies an 
increase in the number of debates if necessary.  AETC staff limited its one 
debate in Forbes to fifty-three minutes of total candidate speech, an average of 
twenty-six minutes each.127  The debate could conveniently be completed in 
one hour, but undoubtedly left many issues unexplored.  Only more time for all 
candidates to speak can fill the deficit of information created by the media.128  
In 1960, for example, approximately 54% of the election stories on the front 
page of The New York Times were framed within the context of policy and 
issues.129  In 1992, however, only 15% were based on policy, while the 
remaining 85% were based on “strategy and electoral success.”130  Similarly, 
the average length of candidate quotes in 1992 news articles (6 lines on the 
front page) was less than half the average length in 1960 (14 lines on the front 
page).131  The trend toward less speech and greater voter apathy becomes a 
cycle that reinforces itself – the less the public hears about politics, the less 
they care, and vice versa.  Providing better, honest discussion is therefore one 
way to stop the cycle. 
 
 127. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 670. 
 128. In the rare situations where an unmanageable number of candidates qualify for a debate, 
the government broadcaster can create content-neutral time, place, and manner rules.  See 
McGlynn v. New Jersey Public Broadcasting Auth., 439 A.2d 54, 62 (N.J. 1981) (stating that a 
statutory access provision permits the government broadcaster flexibility to determine the manner 
in which candidates will debate if the number is unwieldy). 
 129. PATTERSON, supra note 100, at 74. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 76.  Why has the media become so cynical toward politicians?  The question is 
beyond the scope of this Note, but Patterson provides an interesting answer by focusing on two 
major events of the twentieth century – Vietnam and Watergate.  Id. at 19. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Public apathy toward politics, and specifically, toward the two major 
parties, illustrates the importance of minor party voices.  A recent Maricipa 
Research Inc. poll found that more than 60% of Americans favor the formation 
of a new political party.132  As cynical media coverage continues to cover 
political games such as stubborn gridlock, sex scandals, and mudslinging, 
underlying issues are treated as less important.  Not surprisingly, then, media 
often labels minor party candidates who wish to discuss such issues as lacking 
in “news value” and “impact,” resulting in a reversal of political, media, and 
societal values.  The tendency to silence the less “newsworthy” becomes the 
logical next step. 
The Supreme Court has unfortunately expressed its support for such an 
ideology.  Not all candidates can be allowed to debate, yet Forbes allows for 
easy exclusion of practically any third party voice.  The proposed legislation 
attempts to realign reversed political thought through a respect for candidates 
outside the mainstream.  As the recent polls indicate, many potential voters 
sense the need for this change, and with 58% of Democrats and 52% of 
Republicans even favoring the formation of a third party,133 perhaps politicians 
would not be as cynical about the idea as most media gurus would undoubtedly 
claim. 
NOAMAN BARKATULLAH 
 
 132. Tiffany Danitz, A Warming Trend for Third Parties?, INSIGHT OF THE NEWS, Jan. 12, 
1998, at 22. 
 133. Election ‘96 Internet Report, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 1996. 
